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Abstract. We present ongoing work to apply Event-B to the valida-
tion of routes for an Unmanned Aircraft System consisting of a Ground
Control Station and two or more UAVs. We extend the mathematical
language of Event-B to include a theory of continuous paths in 3-D Eu-
clidean space that allows important safety properties describing the safe
separation of UAVs to be formalised in a natural manner. Refinement of
the model allows a mathematically verified route validator algorithm to
be systematically derived.
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1 Introduction
The capabilities of Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) are rapidly increasing,
but this makes the task of demonstrating that such systems are safe increasingly
difficult. This difficulty manifests itself in two ways; the inherent complexity
of the systems themselves, and the compressed timescales under which these
systems are developed.
To address these issues engineers need better ways to capture and analyse the
system requirements, and better ways for building modular systems, in which
the verification evidence for individual components can be combined to provide
verification evidence for the system as a whole. DO-178C [7] opens the door to
the use of formal methods in the certification of civil aircraft, and this approach
is also applicable to the development of Unmanned Aircraft Systems.
An emerging scenario is for a single UAS to have multiple UAVs that collab-
orate to perform a collection of tasks. For such a system, even if it is deployed in
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segregated airspace, there is still a safety requirement that at all times the UAVs
remain a safe distance apart. The routes that are assigned to the UAVs must
therefore be checked to determine that they are safe. One possible architecture
for such a UAS is to have a separate route validator function that checks the
output of the planning function that generates the routes. The idea being that
the route validator can be made simpler than the route generator, and therefore
its correctness more easily shown.
In this paper we present ongoing work to demonstrate how a route validator
function can be systematically derived from a natural mathematical formulation
of the properties required of a set of routes (one per UAV) to be safe. We do
this by extending the mathematical language of the formal method Event-B
with a mathematical theory of continuous paths in 3-D Euclidean space. This
allows safety properties like minimum safe separation to be naturally and clearly
formalised. Then through systematic refinement the model can be refined to one
yielding a mathematically verified algorithm for route validation. A key step in
the refinement chain is the data refinement of the continuous path associated
with each UAV with a corresponding list of waypoints. The gluing invariant
then reconstructs each UAV’s route as the piecewise linear path between the
waypoints. Proof obligations are generated to ensure that these paths are indeed
continuous.
In a final step we aim to (manually at this stage) produce code that imple-
ments the verified algorithm.
2 Event-B
Event-B [2] is a development of the B-Method [1] that extends the scope of
formal modelling to allow for reasoning at the system level. This distinguishes
Event-B from traditional program verification methods like Hoare logic [5] that
only allow for reasoning about the software parts of a system.
Event-B uses set theory and first-order logic as a modelling notation, and one
of the key features of Event-B is the support for refinement. Through refinement
a system can be represented at different levels of abstraction, and mathematical
proof is used to verify the consistency between refinement levels.
The modelling approach is to construct an initial abstract model that de-
scribes the main purpose of the system, and successively refine this model to
layer in other features. Each refinement step modifies or extends the model in
order to introduce new functionality, or add further details of how some goal is
achieved. The resulting chain of refinements facilitates abstraction since it al-
lows us to postpone treatment of some system features to later refinement steps.
Abstraction and refinement together allow us to manage system complexity.
System properties that must always remain true are defined in a model as
invariants on the model variables, and Event-B defines proof obligations to en-
sure that the invariants are preserved by all events. The refinement of a model
(usually referred to as the abstract model) by another model (referred to as the
concrete model) also generates proof obligations, and these must be discharged
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in order to show that any behaviour of the concrete model satisfies the abstract
behaviour. Gluing invariants are used to specify the relationship between the
variables of the abstract and concrete models, and give rise to proof obligations
for pairs of abstract and corresponding concrete events.
The Rodin Platform is an Eclipse-based open source IDE for Event-B that
provides effective support for refinement and mathematical proof [3]. Rodin in-
cludes automatic tools to generate the proof obligations associated with a model,
and provers that attempt to automatically discharge these obligations.
Rodin can also be extended with plug-ins that provide additional function-
ality, and these include:
1. ProB a model checker and animator [6].
2. The UML-B plug-in which supports modelling and refinement of class dia-
grams and state machines, and translates models into Event-B [8].
3. The Theory plug-in which supports extension of the mathematical modelling
language of Event-B, and associated proof rules for the Rodin provers [4].
3 Case Study: Multi-UAV Route Validation
Our case study is route validation for a UAS (Unmanned Aircraft System) con-
sisting of a Ground Control Station (GCS) and two or more UAVs. The case
study itself is synthetic, but has been developed in conjunction with TEKEVER
Ltd 1, and is therefore representative of a real system.
In this hypothetical system, the GCS (in conjunction with the operator)
generates a route for each of the UAVs (possibly generated by some planning
algorithm based upon a set of tasks), and these are then checked by a route
validator to determine that they are safe.
The route validator must ensure that a set of routes (one per UAV) satisfy
the following safety properties:
1. Mutual deconfliction (safe separation between UAVs).
2. That the UAVs stay within airspace constraints (the segregated airspace
assigned to the UAS and any no-fly areas).
3. That the UAVs avoid terrain and other obstacles.
The main focus in the case study will be on the first of these, the need to
maintain safe separation between UAVs.
The output from the case study will be a (manually generated) implemen-
tation of the mathematically verified route validator. TEKEVER aim to test
this implementation in one of their systems, however a complete solution will
require further development. For example, one question that would need to be
addressed is how do the new routes sit with respect to a UAV’s current position,
capabilities, and status?
1 TEKEVER is a company headquartered in Portugal, with an Aerospace, Security,
Defence and Space division focusing on the development of unmanned systems, in-
cluding UAVs. The company has a number of different UAV platform types ranging
from smaller hand-launched aircraft through to >4m wingspan multi-sensor plat-
forms that are being developed in part for maritime search and patrolling missions.
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4 Our Approach
The idea behind our approach, is that through the development of domain spe-
cific mathematical theories, it is be possible to provide an environment in which
complex safety properties can be easily and clearly stated. Moreover, such an
environment can facilitate experimentation with different formulations of sys-
tem safety properties during the requirements gathering and analysis phases of
system development.
For example, in our case study two possible formal statements of the decon-
fliction safety property may be:
∀a, b ∈ U . ∀t ∈ R . a 6= b⇒ min sep ≤ d(ra(t), rb(t)),
or
∀a, b ∈ U . ∀t ∈ R . a 6= b⇒ ∀ta, tb ∈ (t−∆t, t+∆t) . min sep ≤ d(ra(ta), rb(tb)).
Here U is a set of UAVs, and the first statement says that for any pair a and
b of distinct UAVs, and any time t, then the distance between the position ra(t)
of a at time t, and the position rb(t) of b, is at least min sep.
The second statement is similar, but now allows for the fact that the UAVs
may not keep to the time schedule associated with their routes, and instead may
arrive early or late at any point. Here ∆t is some fixed bound on how early or
late we believe a UAV could be.
In both formulations, ra:R → R3 is a continuous path in 3-D Euclidean
space, and d:R3 × R3 → [0,∞) is the usual Euclidean metric. Thus in our
formalisation of the safety properties we are working with real numbers (defined
axiomatically and including the least upper bound axiom) and not floating point
approximations, and moreover we potentially have access to the full expressive
power of continuous mathematics and the differential and integral calculus. 2
To allow the above safety properties to be directly stated in a model of the
route validator we are using the Theory plug-in to extend the mathematical
language of Event-B to include a theory of 3-D Euclidean space (defined as a
normed real vector space with an inner product and the usual metric).
At the abstract level the routes passed to the route validator are simply arbi-
trary continuous paths, and safety invariants can be expressed directly as above.
Then using data refinement the route associated with each UAV is replaced by a
list of waypoints, pairs of position and time, where each waypoint represents the
location of the UAV at the specified time. The gluing invariant for the data re-
finement defines how the route for each UAV can be reconstructed as a piecewise
linear path between the waypoints.
We have developed within the Theory plug-in a mathematical theory of con-
tinuous paths and piecewise linear paths, and defined a mathematical function
2 The Rodin theory of real numbers currently has a definition of continuous functions,
but not differentiation or integration. Adding the basic definitions would be easy
(within the Theory plug-in), but to be useable all the basic theorems of a first
course in real analysis would need to be included too.
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that generates the piecewise linear path associated with a list of waypoints. Proof
obligations were generated to show that the piecewise linear path produced by
this function was indeed a continuous path, and this then established that the
data refinement from routes to waypoint lists was sound.
Work is ongoing to refine the model by splitting the events into more fine-
grained steps until a verified algorithm for the route validator is produced. The
aim is to do this in a modular fashion so that different formulations of the
safety properties can be tried, with the corresponding changes to the algorithm
localised, and the re-verification (proof) effort minimised.
During the project we also aim to produce code (at this stage manually)
that implements the verified algorithms, however, the modelled algorithms will
be expressed in terms of genuine real variables, whereas any implementation
in software will necessarily use floating point variables. There is therefore the
possibility that the coded implementations could deviate from the behaviour of
the mathematically verified algorithms. We hope to address this issue in future
work, but it is out of scope for this project.
5 Conclusion and Future Work
The approach outlined above shows much promise for the formal development of
multi-UAV route planning systems. Future work could include development of
more complete specifications and algorithms for the route validator function, or
the development using the Theory plug-in of a theory of floating point numbers,
and further data refinement of the model from real to floating point variables.
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